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Gelir Eşitsizliği Ayrıştırma Bulgularının Makro Politika Çıkarımları
Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme 
Introduction
Evidence shows that income inequality has increased in most countries over the last three decades and growing income inequality has been a more pressing issue with the Great Recession, the worst economic slump since the Great Depression. Adverse impacts of inequality on macroeconomic stability and economic growth have been established by many studies (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Aghion et. al. 1999 ; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1996) . There has been a great deal of effort in the literature to establish the relationship between economic growth and income inequality but not that much attention has been paid to understand the forces and mechanisms behind income inequality in terms of its extent as well as its change over time. Despite this, over the recent twenty-five, thirty years important contributions have been made in the field in order to identify the sources of inequality inspired also by the breakthrough in inequality measurement via decomposition techniques. By now, the decomposition of inequality indices has become a standard method for analyzing the sources of overall inequality from the various characteristics of the population such as gender, age, ethnic groups, social classes, spatial or residential patterns, or types of sources of income.
The need to assess the quantitative significance of various contributing factors to overall inequality has created interest in the aggregation properties of different indices. Research has led to the additively decomposable class of inequality measures which can be expressed as the sum of two components, in which the first component is the weighted sum of the degree of inequality within each subgroup and the second component captures the degree of inequality between subgroups, i.e., mean outcome differences between the subgroup populations. Shorrock's study in 1984 is a pioneer one, in which classes of additively decomposable inequality measures by subgroup populations are introduced. Many contributors have used this technique to identify the extent to which gender-based income inequality contributes to overall inequality to assess the impact of public policies on income distribution as well as to draw policy recommendations. We consider problematical how these decomposition results are conventionally interpreted and build our arguments using as an example the gender-based decompositions, since gender based income inequality universally comes to the fore among other social stratifiers. The questions we raise here apply not only to gender decompositions though. They could also apply to racial, ethnic or other social stratification-based inequalities existing in economic life 1 . This problem takes a more powerful and a specific form in the case of gender.
The typical policy recommendation is to argue that a reduction of betweengroup income inequality (such as that between the female and male populations) would not have a major impact because the empirical results indicate that it is the 1 See Kanbur (2006) for a more general discussion of the policy significance of inequality decompositions. He argues that any normative use of a decomposition application based upon sex, race, and space needs great caution. Kanbur also argues that recommending that policy should be less concerned with between-group inequality because its share is lower can lead to the neglect of deeper considerations into the sources of inter-group inequality. This discussion delves into these philosophical and conceptual issues and utilizes the specificities of gender inequality to illustrate these conundrums.
within-group inequality which generates most, if not all, of the total inequality. Often, the conclusion is that policies to reduce gender based income inequality should not be a priority, if not indeed, not advisable. For example, an income distribution and poverty study in the literature suggests that: "...the between-group component of inequality is negligible. This implies that policy measures aiming to reduce inequality between-gender will have no influence on total inequality and, as a consequence, are not advisable. The within-group component lies above 99 per cent … [and] .. reveals a greater likelihood for the patterns observed in the literature..." (Fambon and Baye, 2002: 24) .
Another study, on Indonesia, finds analogous results and concludes that between-group inequality is not a prominent factor in overall expenditure inequality 2 as it constitutes only 3-4 per cent of total inequality. Accordingly, the authors argue that the elimination of gender inequality would not reduce total expenditure inequality by much. Furthermore, the authors report that within-group inequality is larger among female-headed households than male-headed households (Akita et. al., 1999: 215) . Findings from advanced country cases present a similar picture. For instance, a study by Cholezas and Tsakloglou (2007: 4) finds that among eight European countries they study, there are only four countries -Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg -where gender differences account for more than 5 per cent of the recorded earnings inequality.
Similar to the evidence on gender based decompositions, Anand (1983) shows that inequality between ethnic groups in Malaysia accounted for only 15 percent of total inequality in the 1970s. Based on this finding, he recommends that government strategy should focus on inequality within ethnic groups rather than that between them. Likewise, Cowell and Jenkins (1995) find that most income inequality remains unexplained after taking into account the age, sex, race and earner status of the household head in the U.S., and argue that a major component of inequality is to be found within these population groups. There are quite a few more examples of these kinds of findings, but these are illustrative examples. Do these findings mean that policymakers in these countries should pay more attention to within group inequalities rather than inequalities between groups? Should policy 2 While expenditures are taken as the most reliable indicator of economic well-being in these studies, income and well-being tend to be used interchangeably. From a feminist perspective the quantitative analysis of gender-based income inequality based solely on observed income or expenditures has several important shortcomings, by itself. Sen's capabilities approach argues that the focus should instead be on people's 'beings' and their 'doings' from these capabilities to function in a society. Observed income is mainly related to the means of living but actual opportunities for living a dignified life are what determine individual capabilities (Nussbaum and Glover, 1995; Robeyns, 2003 In this study, we question the plausibility of the policy recommendations based on a comparison of relative contributions of between-and within-group inequality. We base our argument on two grounds. First, there are strong grounds to support a view that contributions of within-and between-subgroup inequality components are contextually incommensurable. While it is numerically possible to compare the two sources of inequality, the "zero-degree" benchmark against which their numerical contributions are measured are conceptually different. We argue that the meaning of the zero-degree of inequality benchmark for each component can be quite different, so that interpreting their distance against this benchmark in the same way would be like comparing apples with oranges. While zero-degree of inequality for the overall inequality is generally interpreted as the most desirable state in an income distribution, it is reasonable to argue that a zero degree of between-group inequality is a benchmark consistent with a bare minimum standard. In contrast, the benchmark for within-group inequality component can be considered as the condition of formal equality (to be discussed below). Thus, the deviation of measured inequality from each of these benchmarks corresponds to different inequality conditions whose significance may not be proportional to each component's share in total index value. As a result, each of the components' deviation from its benchmark will require a different approach from the point of view of interpretation and policy design.
The second argument is that there is a lot of evidence, and related conceptual considerations, that indicate that in most social contexts the degree of within-group inequality is higher for female population than in the male counterpart. These findings, unsurprisingly, justify the recommendation of education policies targeted to women. Precisely because these policies might play an important role in achieving equal opportunities for both women and men, one cannot dismiss the fact that the higher degree of within-group inequality among women might be the result of an implicit selection bias that lies within the stratified structure of markets, for which targeted education policies, while desirable by themselves, could play a role in increasing the numerical incidence of within-group inequality among women. The gendered structure of labor markets frequently results in counting only the female population who are recorded as working and who are earning the levels of income lying in the both tails of the income distribution of the entire population. Females who are economically active are mostly either the ones who have the opportunity to have a higher degree of education with better occupations or those who have no other choice but to work despite the low-pay since they cannot afford to be out of the market. This implicit selection bias problem should be taken into account before any policy-related argument is drawn out in interpreting withingroup inequality.
The Benchmark Standard -Equality among Whom?
Developments in research in the last three decades have led to the use of the so-called generalized entropy class of inequality measures, which basically satisfy the additive decomposability condition 3 . This property allows for a full decomposition of total inequality 4 (I t ) as the sum of within-group (I w ) and betweengroup inequality (I b ) as: I t =I w +I b . Consequently, additive decomposability permits comparing the percentage ratio of each component to the total index value, one can, thereby obtaining the extent of their contributions to overall inequality. Policy recommendations are designed mostly on the basis of this outcome. Going back to the gender-based inequality decomposition, I w represents the weighted 5 average of inequality measure for female and male population derived separately. I b indicates the difference between the mean outcome of income distribution of female population and male population as weighted again by the size of each group. Here we argue that the distances from the benchmark are not comparable among these three elements.
3 There are some basic statistical properties, such as symmetry (the rearrangement of given set of incomes among different members should give the same index value) and Pigou-Dalton (a progressive transfer must lower the index value), among others, that a measure must satisfy in order to provide a meaningful ordering of different distributions according to the extent of inequality (see Shorrocks (1988) and Atkinson, (1970) . In addition, since many researchers as well as policy makers are interested in separating total inequality into its subcomponents, decomposability, even one that permits the luxury of additive decomposability, have been sought after and heavily used. In this note, we choose to focus on the conceptual issues of decomposition results. 4 See Foster and Shneyerov (1999) In a generalized form the additively decomposable measures are defined as:
with subgroup weights as .
Note that when c=0 traditional Theil index is obtained. 5 Weights might be different depending on which index is used with the parameter c in footnote 4 varies, but mainly they are weighted according to the size of each sub-group in total population.
Let's consider the condition of zero-degree of inequality for all three Is. For I t , the benchmark equality occurs when each and every individual earns the same level income no matter how different their job characteristics and their demographic characteristics are. In other words, it is possible to say that it indicates the strict egalitarian or numerical equality 6 position. The strict egalitarian principle of distributive justice simply states that everyone has to receive the same level of income since each and every person deserves equal respect. Using this definition we may call the condition where every individual earns the same level of income as the numerical equality position. Different theories of justice criticize strict egalitarian equality on a variety of grounds, including the Rawlsian difference principle on utility space; the desert-based principle on effort/merit and the capability approach in the space of opportunities and functionings. Numerical equality has been criticized for not being consistent with various notions of the "just condition." It has also been argued to be untenable and/or conflicting with individual freedoms. Philosophical debates on whether the benchmark case is the 'just' condition or not are beyond the scope of this essay. We also do not intend to delve too deeply into the underlying philosophical issues, but, we note that even a quick look at the empirical evidence on income distribution indicates that numerical equality is an even more unreachable condition today, given the increasing earnings differentials emanating from differences in occupations, industry, age, education level, marital status, gender, race, ethnicity and other stratifications (ILO, 2007 and 2013) . Even though these empirical trends suggest that strict equality is more distant, this condition can be described as the most desirable case from a strict egalitarian point of view.
The equality benchmark condition for within-group component, on the other hand, indicates the situation when each individual in the male population earns the mean outcome of the distribution of male income and each female individual earns the mean outcome of distribution of income for female population, despite other differences in job characteristics or demographic differences other than gender. The benchmark situation in this case, can be associated with the formal equality principle, which requires that we 'treat like cases as alike', with the idea that there cannot be any morally relevant difference between like cases. All basic concepts of justice are somehow related to treating like cases as alike, but most common conceptions of justice also go beyond that.
It is possible to describe the benchmark condition for within-group inequality component as formal equality if only the rule of likeness is satisfied by the same gender condition. Evidence on income differences within the same gender, which are explained mainly by the differences in terms of educational attainment, experience or job characteristics, would indicate again that the benchmark condition appears to be difficult to reach even though desired. Similarly, as in the overall inequality case, except for the strict egalitarians, some would argue that such differences are often morally acceptable i.e., there are justifiable disparities leading to unequal income outcomes. In the literature, debates on residual income gaps i.e., the portion of income differences which cannot be explained by conventional factors is taken as the part that has no moral basis, implying that the 'explained' part is acceptable. Thus accordingly, one might derive the argument that some degree of within-group inequality might be justified by conventional differences that are accepted as morally appropriate. On the other hand, among other theories of distributive justice, the capability approach 7 would require looking at the sources of differences in these attainments in order to determine whether they reflect unequal opportunities sustained by unjustifiable systemic factors. This suggests that the acceptable degree of within-group inequality, as would also be the case in regard to the degree of overall inequality, is debatable and that whether it can be or should be equal to zero will depend on one's moral starting point.
Turning our attention towards the between-group inequality component, a zero-degree of inequality can be obtained when the mean income of the female population is equal to the mean income of male counterpart. To put it differently, zero between-group inequality occurs when females and males earn the same average level of income. The zero benchmark standard represents the minimum standard if we take position that it is immoral to accept differences in income or any disparities in terms of functionings based on gender differences. On the principle of equal dignity and respect, these differences cannot be taken as acceptable unless there is a higher moral principle of justice that allows for a natural human hierarchy between genders justifying such inequality. A human hierarchy is not considered natural on any moral principle due to the idea of natural rights. It can thus be argued that zero-degree of gender inequality can be deemed as an essential or necessary condition, not a final target to progressively approach. Any non-zero level of inequality based on gender alone violates our notions of natural rights. Even a 7 The capability approach applies a normative evaluation determine what people are able to be and to do and is concerned with things that matter intrinsically; their capabilities reflect the differences in means for well-being such as what they consume and their income. For an extended discussion on Sen's capability approach and how we can use the capability approach to explore gender inequalities see Robeyns (2003) .
statistically minuscule deviation from zero, would be a strong violation of generally accepted notions of gender equality.
Algebraically, in considering inequality decomposition estimates, this "strong violation" principle requires only that the mean incomes of the male and female population be equal. It does not require that the distribution of income for female population and male population share other distribution parameters or be identical. However, it is still possible to argue that the factors behind the differences in the two distributions could reflect inequalities, which might not be acceptable or justified. In many societies, there is a variety of social and historical factors preventing the equality of incomes between females and males even between those holding the same jobs. Gender discrimination obstructs equal opportunities in terms of education, training, jobs, occupations and/or equal valuation of types of work done by women and men. If gender-equality is only achieved principally in terms of what people able to do, then why would not the mean outcomes for females and males be expected to be equal? This in fact illustrates why the "strong violation" principle is only a minimum requirement.
In light of these considerations, a policy statement that says that 'only' 3 or 4 per cent of overall inequality is attributable to between-group inequality and is negligible compared to 97 or 96 percent corresponding to within-group inequality is quite problematic. Arguing that 3 per cent is small is questionable because even this small amount could signal significant discrimination in the contextual space and, since it would be most difficult inequality to reduce, should garner society's attention. We are not suggesting that targeting within-group inequality is not needed. Introducing policies to reduce the distance to the most desirable state is always desirable but this could be at the cost of neglecting the identification of policies redressing the violation of the bare minimum condition, a failure many value systems would consider catastrophic. This is the idea that lies at the heart of our argument when we claim the shares of each contributing component are incommensurable on the basis of first principles.
Labor Market Stratifications and Hidden Selection Bias
We turn towards the second argument related to widespread findings of a higher degree of within-group inequality for one/some subgroup(s) in comparison to others. For example, gender based inequality decompositions in general identify higher earnings inequality among women vis-à-vis among their male counterparts. One well-known underlying factor is the existence of selection bias implicit in the distribution of incomes within the female population. Data on economic activity rates of females and males provides some supporting evidence for this argument. We observe that female activity rate, taken in terms of its narrow economic definition, is lower than that of males across the world 8 . Furthermore, studies on the patterns of female participation in the labor market indicate a U-shaped pattern with respect to the education level, 9 implying that either the ones who earn high incomes have access to better opportunities on one side and those females who have to work despite the precariousness of the available jobs since they cannot basically afford to be outside the labor market on the other side. This latter group constitutes the majority of working women. Across the globe, evidence shows that more women than men work as part-time workers. Women are more likely to work in informal 10 , temporary type of jobs such as domestic workers, home-based workers 11 , and, if 8 On a global scale the average ratio of female participation to paid work is 51% and very low compared to male population (78%) (ILO, 2009: 37) . In the regions except developed countries, European Union and Eastern Europe countries this gap is even wider. Parallel to Middle East and North African countries in Turkey too gender-based gap in labor force participation rises to much higher levels. In Turkey as of 2013, labor force participation of women and men corresponds to 71 and 31 percent respectively. Among other reasons care workload of ranks the first reason keeping women in Turkey outside 'the labor force' (TurkStat, 2009). In certain cases unpaid labor of women limits the time they spend for subsistence production, voluntary work or market participation. The findings indicating that in Sub-Saharan Africa homecare services of HIV/AIDS patients pose obstacles in female participation to labor are some of the supportive data (Akintola, 2004: 22-28) . Time-use survey data reveal that with respect to unpaid work hours in the group of developing countries like South Africa, Guatemala, Mauritius and OECD countries such as the United States, Japan and France the gap between male and female workers reaches as high as five hours. From this angle Turkey-compared to these countries -stands before us as one of the nations with greater gender gap. Regardless whether women participate in the labor market or not, regardless of their employment status, women's unpaid work time is higher than that of men. In Turkey, female workers who work in the labor market spend 4 hours 3 minutes for household chores and care work while male workers spend solely 43 minutes. In comparison with certain Western states this gap is four times higher (TurkStat, 2006) . 9 See Michaelowa and Waller (2005) for non-OECD countries and OECD (2001) confirming this Ushaped pattern in both developing and developed countries. 10 Lack of social security, regulatory deficiencies, low income and poor work conditions are the features determining the way of informal of work. It has frequently been emphasized that across the world at least 60% of female workers are employed informally. This ratio differs greatly with respect to regions however stand higher than that of men. For instance in Sub-Saharan Africa the ratio of informal employment amongst male workers is 63% but 84% amongst female workers. In Latin America these ratios are respectively 58% and 48% for male and female workers. (Chen et al., 2004: 1-6 ). As we investigate the ratio of female workers in informal employment we observe that the percentage reaches as high as 80% in some countries. High informality is also associated with sectoral segregation based on gender. The agriculture sector has saved itself from being the primary work place for women in many countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa where seven almost out of 10 women are agricultural workers this ratio is higher than 65% and women are mostly forced to work in agriculture sector with no or little financial security. 11 Because of the presence of gender based differences and lower bargaining power of women in the labor market, women are widely scattered in home-based production forms of informal employment or street vending which is less stable, comparatively less paid and with no wage guarantee (UNIFEM, 2005: 58-72) . Turkish labor market is a case in point. As the distribution of female workers in Turkey is analyzed with respect to workplace, though the ratio of women employed in a regular workplace has risen over time, it surfaces that the ratio equals to roughly 40% of total employment. More than 60% of women are employed in places such as houses, fields or mobile workplaces. According to year 2005 data, in Turkey also more than half (51.1%) of total employment (22,838) is within informal sector. 93% of casual they have a paid regular job, face occupational or industry-based segregation more frequently than men, which result in increased pay-penalties for women (ILO, 2002 (ILO, , 2003 (ILO, , 2007 (ILO, and 2013 12 . These observations apply in both the South and the North. The women who can afford to be out or who have to be out of the job market due to the responsibilities at home are usually found in the middle of the income distribution. Given this structure, it cannot be very surprising to observe higher within-group inequality for females than males.
Related studies usually recommend educational interventions which emphasize in particular girls' education to reduce the higher degree of inequality within the female population. Leaving aside the problem that this policy in many societies reflects an undervaluation of women's work outside formal markets, as long as gender disparities exist in employment patterns and/or in access to job opportunities, educational policies by themselves cannot be sufficient to reduce the wider polarization in income distribution among women. In fact research has shown by simulations that even under the assumption that educational attainment is generated for the worse-off group by the process associated with the better-off group 13 , the overall earnings inequality is reduced only slightly and in some cases this has an effect of increasing the existing inequality measure (Cunningham and Jacobsen, 2008) . The authors display these results for four Latin American countries employees are informally employed and 96% of unpaid family workers (in agriculture this figure reaches as far as 98%) face such work conditions (TurkStat, 2005) . The two forms of employment mostly occupied by women-self employment and unpaid family works-are described as 'vulnerable employment' by ILO. As reported by ILO (2008) in Sub-Saharan Africa region in year 2007 among all employed women 8 of every 10 women (81,7 %) were either unpaid family workers or self employed under risky working conditions. Amongst women, the ratio of unpaid family workers is 34,7% but among men it is 18,4%. In Turkey also, almost eighty percent of the women employed are either self-employed (18.5%) or unpaid family workers (55.9%) which underlines that women constitute a remarkable share in vulnerable employment. This revelation is more applicable to agricultural sector where both forms of employment are more common. To illustrate, 75% of female agriculture workers are unpaid family workers and 19% are self employed. Similar to other developing countries, in Turkey also the likelihood of women to be placed in vulnerable employment (48%) is higher than men (28%). The close link between vulnerable employment form and lack of social security is clearly evident in Turkish case. According to October 2009 data, 45% of total employees work without social security and this ratio is 60% amongst women. It has frequently been underscored that there is a tight connection between poverty and vulnerable female employment. In parts of the world where poverty is deeper it is seen that the risk is higher for women to end up as a member of vulnerable employment group (ILO, 2009: 10-17) . 12 Gender segregation in worklife is observed not only at sectoral level but also at occupational level as well. Women are employed basically in work fields that bear similar characteristics to the works at home which are service sector, cleaning and care-giving, education and health. This division brings with itself low wages in the sectors and professions dominated by women. Gender based segregation in the labor market can be observed when looked at the number of women employed in industry sector, which is only 15% in Turkey and a great part of this group is employed in labor intensive, low wage sub sectors such as textile, clothing and food. 13 Basic framework for such simulations are done in three steps as estimation and prediction of education level, occupational distribution and earnings distributions under the assumption as if each attainment were equal for example among women and men (Cunningham and Jacobsen, 2008: 8-10 ).
(Guyana, Brazil, Bolivia and Guatemala) and argue that within-group, rather than between-group, inequality is the key factor underlying the high inequality observed. They also argue that despite the fact that between-group differentials have been a primary focus of research in understanding inequality and its sources, decreasing between-group inequalities are not likely to be the key factors to diminishing overall inequality, at least in the Latin American context (Cunningham and Jacobsen, p.15 ). In addition, based on simulation results, they present how difficult it is to achieve reduction in within-group inequality: "…..decreasing within-group inequality is quite difficult, as making adjustments at obvious entry points for such steps has little effect on the overall wage distribution. When we simulated rewarding women the same as men, indigenous the same as non-indigenous, or black the same as whiteany or all of which might occur in affirmative action programs-overall measured inequality changed little. Similarly, when we simulated equalizing endowment accumulation processes among groups, there was again little change in the overall inequality measures…." (Cunningham and Jacobsen, 2008: 15) .
These results are indeed not surprising given high levels of within group inequality. More importantly, as pointed by Cunningham and Jacobsen (2008) , there exist many unobservable factors behind earnings inequality. Discriminatory social institutions in the labor markets including the markets themselves operate concomitantly that cannot be observed by actual attainments explicitly. This is more so if the focus is only the differentials in terms of individual characteristics such as educational attainments, where the gaps reflect the outcomes of social values, norms and socioeconomic distinctions. On the other hand these gaps in education per se exacerbate existing inequalities.
In order to understand the sources of polarized outcomes of income distribution for different social groups, more detailed research is required, analyzing its various dimensions in multiple spaces. While it is reasonable to argue that specific fiscal measures such as social assistance or educational policies might be required and helpful, these interventions are not sufficient unless the socially stratified structure of economic life is taken into account in all its complexity.
Conclusions
Growing income inequality is addressed as the major risk we are currently facing. Even by the World Economic Forum survey in 2014, income inequality has been identified as the biggest threat to global economy. Reducing income inequality is at the outset warranted for macroeconomic stability and higher economic growth but more so for living in a more equitable society. Policies targeting inequality should be evidence based but need to be much beyond the standard recipes. Holistic perspective and a comprehensive endeavor are required at multiple fronts. Various redistributive fiscal policies such as tax and social spending policies have been implemented and widely recommended in order to achieve more equal distribution of income. Specific policy measures are legitimized referring to the evidence obtained with decomposition of overall income inequality by different social groups in a society. Inequality decompositions are useful to identify relative contributions of different components of inequality to the overall. However, designing specific policies based on the empirical findings directly from the numbers presented these studies requires cautious interpretations.
Empirical findings often display that the portion of overall income inequality that corresponds to between group differentials is not as important as the intra-group differentials. Decompositions based on gender illustrate this quite strongly. It is often found that the contribution of the income inequality between women and men in a society is much lower than the inequality among women and among men. In addition inequality among women is much higher than that of men. Hence, it is argued that the within inequality particularly among women requires more attention and policies are designed to improve 'abilities' of the worse-off group(s). Such statements can easily shift policy makers' attention to fixing women or black or some ethnic group vis-à-vis the advantaged groups, rather than focusing on the fundamental issues and underlying structural sources.
In this study, we try to build the argument that reckless interpretations of decomposition results can have major drawbacks particularly in the cases of social group decompositions. First within-and between-subgroup inequality components indeed convey completely different social contents and are contextually incommensurable. Secondly, higher within-group inequality obtained frequently in empirical studies often reflect the socially-stratified structured nature of the labor markets beyond the differentials with respect to labor supply characteristics that are observed on the surface. More problematic is that these characteristics are treated as the initial endowments i.e. as exogenous determinants of the existing level of income inequality.
Both of the considerations provide the basis for eliciting caution in any interpretation of the findings from subgroup decompositions of income inequality 14 . A direct, nuanced, reading of decomposition results to guide policy design can be quite "economistic" in the normal sense of the term. Economic analysis is only a first step in the search for policy recommendations on income distribution, but it cannot be sufficient in itself to determine the appropriate policies to be implemented. To derive policy suggestions, one does need normative principles and consider economics in a wider social canvas, rather than confining policy design to the conventional purview that the discipline suggests. One needs to understand what is behind the theories as well as the numbers that explain or describe inequality. As Sen puts it "...we have to be clear on the nature of the 'theory' underlying the practice of extreme inequality and be prepared to outline what justice may minimally demand... ' (Sen, 1995, p. 270) . Applying justice and normative principles, on the other hand, opens up a whole array of philosophical questions that are imperative before designing policy.
